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Abstract—The role that YouTube and its behind-the-scenes
recommendation algorithm plays in encouraging online radical-
ization has been suggested by both journalists and academics
alike. This study directly quantifies these claims by examining
the role that YouTubes algorithm plays in suggesting radicalized
content. After categorizing nearly 800 political channels, we were
able to differentiate between political schemas in order to analyze
the algorithm traffic flows out and between each group. After
conducting a detailed analysis of recommendations received by
each channel type, we refute the popular radicalization claims. To
the contrary, these data suggest that YouTubes recommendation
algorithm actively discourages viewers from visiting radicalizing
or extremist content. Instead, the algorithm is shown to favor
mainstream media and cable news content over independent
YouTube channels with slant towards left-leaning or politi-
cally neutral channels. Our study thus suggests that YouTubes
recommendation algorithm fails to promote inflammatory or
radicalized content, as previously claimed by several outlets.
Index Terms—YouTube, recommendation algorithm, radical-
ization
I. INTRODUCTION
The internet can both be a powerful force for good, prosocial
behaviors by providing means for civic participation and com-
munity organization [1], as well as an attractor for antisocial
behaviors that create polarizing extremism [2]. This dual
nature of the internet has been evident since the early days
of online communication, where ”flame-wars” and ”trolling”
have been present in online communities for over two decades
[3] [4] [5]. While such behaviors were previously confined
to Usenet message boards and limited IRC channels, with
the expansion of social media, blogs, and microblogging
following the rapid growth of internet participation rates, these
inflammatory behaviors are no longer confined and have left
their early back-channels into public consciousness [6].
The explosion of platforms, as well as ebbs and flows in the
political climate, has exacerbated the prevalence of antisocial
messaging [7]. Research focusing on uninhibited or antisocial
communication, as well as extremist messaging online has
previously been conducted on platforms including Facebook
[8], Twitter [9], Reddit [10], 4chan and 8chan [11] [12],
Tumblr [13] and even knitting forums such as Ravelry [14].
In addition to these prior studies on other platforms, at-
tention has recently been paid to the role that YouTube
may play as a platform for radicalization [15] [16] [17].
As a content host, YouTube provides a great opportunity for
broadcasting a large and widely diverse set of ideas to millions
of people worldwide. Included among general content creators
are those who specifically target users with polarizing and
radicalizing political content. While YouTube and other social
media platforms have generally taken a strict stance against
most inflammatory material on their platform, extremist groups
from jihadi terrorist organizations [18] [19], various political
positions [20], and conspiracy theorists have nonetheless been
able to permeate the content barrier [21].
Extreme content exists on a spectrum. YouTube and other
social media platforms have generally taken a strict stance
against the most inflammatory materials or materials that
are outright illegal. No social media platform tolerates ISIS
beheading videos, child porn, or videos depicting cruelty
towards animals. There seems to a consensus amongst all
social media platforms that human moderators or moderation
algorithms will remove this type of content [22].
YouTube’s automatic removal of the most extreme content,
such as explicitly violent acts, child pornography, and animal
cruelty, has created a new era of algorithmic data mining
[23] [24] [13]. These methods range from metadata scans
[25] to sentiment analysis [26]. Nevertheless, content within
an ideological grey area or that can nonetheless be perceived
as ”radicalizing” exists on YouTube [27]. Definitions of free
speech differ from country to country. However, YouTube
operates on a global scale within the cultural background of the
United States with robust legislation that protects speech [7].
Even if there are limitations to what YouTube will broadcast,
the platform does allow a fair bit of content that could be
deemed as radicalizing, either by accident or by lack of
monitoring resources.
Means such as demonetization, flagging, or comment lim-
iting is several tools available to content moderators on
YouTube [28]. Nevertheless, removing or demonetizing videos
or channels that present inflammatory content has not curtailed
scrutiny of YouTube by popular media [29]. Recently, the New
York Times published a series of articles, notably critiquing
YouTube’s recommendation algorithm, which suggests related
videos for users based on their prior preferences and users
with similar preferences [30] [15]. The argument put forward
by the NYT is that users would not otherwise have stumbled
upon extremist content if they were not actively searching for
it since the role of recommendation algorithms for content on
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other websites is less prevalent. As such, YouTube’s algorithm
may have a role in guiding content, and to some extent, prefer-
ences towards more extremist predispositions. Critical to this
critique is that while previous comments on the role that social
media websites play in spreading radicalization have focused
on user contributions, the implications of the recommendation
algorithm strictly implicate YouTube’s programming as an
offender.
The critique of the recommendation algorithm is another
difference that sets YouTube apart from other platforms. In
most cases, researchers are looking at how the users apply
social media tools as ways to spread jihadism [18], alt-right
messages of white supremacy [12]. Studies are also focusing
on the methods the content creators might use to recruit more
participants in various movements; for example, radical left-
wing Antifa protests [31]. Nevertheless, the premise is that
users of Facebook, Tumblr, or Twitter would not stumble upon
extremists if they are not actively searching for it since the
role of recommendation algorithms is less prevalent. There
are always some edge cases where innocuous Twitter hashtags
can be co-opted for malicious purposes by extremists or
trolls [19], but in general, users get what they specifically
seek. However, the case for YouTube is different: the rec-
ommendation algorithm is seen as a major factor in how
users engage with YouTube content. Thus, the claims about
YouTube’s role in radicalization are twofold. First, there are
content creators that publish content that has the potential
to radicalize [15]. Second, YouTube is being scrutinized for
how and where the recommendation algorithm directs the
user traffic [17] [15]. Nevertheless, empirical evidence of
YouTube’s role in radicalization is insufficient [32]. There are
anecdotes of a radicalization pipeline and hate group rabbit
hole, but academic literature on the topic is scant, as we
discuss in the next section.
II. PRIOR ACADEMIC STUDIES ON YOUTUBE
RADICALIZATION
Data-drive papers analyzing radicalization trends online are
an emerging field of inquiry. To date, few notable studies have
examined YouTube’s content in relation to radicalization. As
discussed, previous studies have concentrated on the content
itself and have widely proposed novel means to analyze
these data [13] [33] [25]. However, these studies focus on
introducing means for content analysis, rather than the content
analysis itself.
However, a few studies go beyond content analysis methods.
One such study, Ottoni et al. (218), analyzed the language
used in right-wing channels compared to their baseline chan-
nels. The study concludes that there was little bias against
immigrants or members of the LGBT community, but there
was limited evidence for prejudice towards Muslims. However,
the study did find evidence for the negative language used
by channels labeled as right-wing. Nevertheless, this study
has a few weaknesses. The authors of this paper frame their
analysis as an investigation into right-wing channels but then
proceed to analyze kooky conspiracy channels instead of
more mainstream right-wing content. They have chosen a
conspiracy theorist Alex Jones’ InfoWars (nowadays removed
from YouTube) as their seed channel, and their list of right-
wing channels reflects this particular niche. InfoWars and
other conspiracy channels represent only a small segment
of right-wing channels. Besides, the study applies a topic
analysis method derived from the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) [34]. However, the validity of IAT has been contested
[35]. In conclusion, we consider the seed channel selection as
problematic and the range of the comparison channels as too
vaguely explained [36].
In addition to content analysis of YouTube’s videos, Riberio
et al. (2019) took a novel approach by analyzing the content
of video comment sections, explaining which types of videos
individual users were likely to comment on overtime. Catego-
rizing videos in four categories, including alt-right, alt-light,
the intellectual dark web (IDW), and a final control group,
the authors found inconclusive evidence of migration between
groups of videos. 1
The analysis shows that a portion of commenters does
migrate from IDW videos to the alt-light videos. There is also
a tiny portion of commenter migration from the centrist IDW
to the potentially radicalizing alt-right videos. However, we
believe that one cannot conclude that YouTube is a radicalizing
force based on commenter traffic only. There are several
flaws in the setting of the study. Even though the study
is commendable, it is also omitting the migration from the
center to the left-of-center altogether, presenting a somewhat
skewed view of the commenter traffic. In addition, only a
tiny fraction of YouTube viewers engage in commenting. For
example, the most popular video by Jordan Peterson, a central
character of the IDW, has 4.7 million views but only ten
thousand comments. Besides, commenting on a video does
not necessarily mean agreement with the content. A person
leaving a comment on a controversial topic might stem from
a desire to get a reaction (trolling or flaming) from either
the content creator or other viewers [37] [5]. We are hesitant
to draw any conclusions based on the commenter migration
without analyzing the content of the comments.
The most recent study by Munger and Phillips (2019)
directly analyzed YouTube’s recommendation algorithm and
suggested that the algorithm operated on a simple supply-
and-demand principle. That is, rather than algorithms driving
viewer preference and further radicalization, further radicaliza-
tion external to YouTube inspired content creators to produce
more radicalized content. The study furthermore failed to find
support for radicalization pathways, instead of finding that
1The study borrows a definition for the alt-right from Anti-Defamation
League: ”loose segment of the white supremacist movement consisting of
individuals who reject mainstream conservatism in favor of politics that
embrace racist, anti-Semitic and white supremacist ideology” (pp. 2 [32]). The
alt-light is defined to be a civic nationalist group rather than racial nationalism
groups. The third category, ”intellectual dark web” (IDW), is defined as a
collection of academics and podcasters who engage in controversial topics.
The fourth category, the control group, includes a selection of channels form
fashion magazine channels such as the (Cosmopolitan and GQ Magazine) to
a set of left-wing and right-wing mainstream media outlets.
the growth belonging to the centrist IDW category reflected a
deradicalization trend rather than further radicalization. Never-
theless, these authors are critical towards claims that watching
content on Youtube will lead to the spread of radical ideas
like a ”zombie bite” and are further critical of the potential
pipeline from moderate, centrist channels to radical right-wing
content.
III. ANALYZING THE YOUTUBE RECOMMENDATION
ALGORITHM
Our study focuses on the YouTube recommendation algo-
rithm and the direction of recommendations between different
groups of political content. To analyze the common claims
from media and other researchers, we have distilled them into
specific claims that can be assessed using our data set.
C1 - Radical Bubbles. Recommendations influence viewers
of radical content to watch more similar content than they
would otherwise, making it less likely that alternative views
are presented.
C2 - Right-Wing Advantage. YouTube’s recommendation
algorithm prefers right-wing content over other perspectives.
C3 - Radicalization Influence. YouTube’s algorithm
influences users by exposing them to more extreme content
than they would otherwise seek out.
C4 - Right-Wing Radicalization Pathway. YouTube
algorithm influences viewers of mainstream and center-left
channels by recommending extreme right-wing content,
content that aims to disparage left-wing or centrist narratives.
By analyzing whether the data supports these claims, we will
be able to draw preliminary conclusions on the impact of the
recommendation algorithm.
A. YouTube Channel Selection Criteria
The data for this study is collected from two sources.
First, YouTube offers a few tools for software developers and
researchers. Our research applies an application programming
interface (API) that YouTube provides for other websites that
integrate with YouTube and also for research purposes to de-
fine the channel information, including view and engagement
statistics and countries. However, the YouTube API limited
the amount of information we could retrieve and the period it
could be kept and was thus not entirely suitable for this study.
For this reason, we use an additional scraping algorithm that
provides us information on individual video statistics such as
views, likes, video title, and closed captions. This algorithm
offers data since the first of January, 2018. The scraping
algorithm also provides us the primary data applied for this
study: the recommendations that YouTube’s recommendation
algorithm offers for each video. The scraping process runs
daily.
The scraped data, as well as the YouTube API, provides us
a view of the recommendations presented to an anonymous
account. In other words, the account has not ”watched” any
videos, retaining the neutral baseline recommendations, de-
scribed in further detail by YouTube in their recent paper that
explains the inner workings of the recommendation algorithm
[38]. One should note that the recommendations list provided
to a user who has an account and who is logged into YouTube
might differ from the list presented to this anonymous account.
However, we do not believe that there is a drastic difference in
the behavior of the algorithm. Our confidence in the similarity
is due to the description of the algorithm provided by the
developers of the YouTube algorithm [38]. It would seem
counter-intuitive for YouTube to apply vastly different criteria
for anonymous users and users who are logged into their
accounts, especially considering how complex creating such
a recommendation algorithm is in the first place.
The study includes eight hundred and sixteen (816) channels
which fulfill the following criteria:
• Channel has over ten thousand subscribers.
• More than 30 percent of the content on the channel is
political.
The primary channel selection was made based on the number
of subscriptions. The YouTube API provides channel details,
including the number of subscribers and aggregate views of
all time on the channel. The sizes of the bubble are based
on the video views in the year 2018m, not the subscriber
counts. YouTube also provides detailed info on the views of
each video and dislikes, thus providing information on the
additional engagement each video receives from the users.
Generally, only channels that had over ten thousand sub-
scriptions were analyzed. However, if the channel’s subscrip-
tion numbers were lower than our threshold value or there
were missing data. However, if the channel is averaging over
ten thousand views per month, the channel was still included.
We based our selection criteria on the assumption that
tiny channels with minimal number of views or subscriptions
are unlikely to fulfill YouTube’s recommendation criteria: ”1)
engagement objectives, such as user clicks, and degree of en-
gagement with recommended videos; 2) satisfaction objectives,
such as user liking a video on YouTube, and leaving a rating
on the recommendation [38].”
Another threshold for the channels was the focus of the
content: only channels where more than 30 percent of the
content was on US political or cultural news or cultural
commentary, were selected. We based the cultural commentary
selection on a list of social issues on the website ISideWith.
A variety of qualitative techniques compiled the list of these
channels.
The lists provided by Ad Fontes Media provides a starting
point for the more mainstream and well-known alternative
sites. Several blogs and other websites further list political
channels or provide tools for advanced searches based on
topics [39] [40] [41]. We also analyzed the recent academic
studies and their lists of channels such as Ribero et al. (2019)
and Munger and Philips (2019). However, not all channels
included in these two studies fit our selection criteria. Thus
one can observe differences between the channel lists and
categories between our research and other recent studies on
a similar subject.
We added emerging channels by following the YouTube
recommendation algorithm, which suggests similar content
and which fit the criteria and passed our threshold. We can con-
ceptualize the recommendation algorithm as a type of snowball
sampling, a common technique applied in social sciences when
one is conducting interview-based data collection but also in
the analysis of social networks. Each source is ”requested”
to nominate a few candidates that would be of interest to the
study. The researcher follows there recommendations until the
informants reveal no new information or the inclusion criteria
are met (e.g., channels become too marginal, or content is
not political). In our case, there is a starting point; a channel
acts as a node in the network. Each connected channel (e.g.,
node) in the network is visited. Depending on the content of
the channel, it is either added to the collection of channels
or discarded. Channels are visited until there are no new
channels, or the new channels do not fit the original selection
criteria [42].
B. The Categorization Process
The categorization of YouTube channels was a non-trivial
task. Activist organizations provide lists and classifications, but
many of them are unreliable. For example, there are several
controversies around the lists of hate groups discussed by the
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) [43]. Also, there seems
to be a somewhat contentious relationship between the Anti-
Defamation League and YouTubers [44] [45]. We decided to
create our categorization, based on multiple existing sources.
First, one has several resources to categorize mainstream
or alternative media outlets. Mainstream media such as CNN
or Fox News have been studied and categorized over time by
various outlets [46] [47]. In our study, we applied two sites
that provide information on the political views of mainstream
media outlets: Ad Fontes Media and Media Bias Factcheck.
Neither website is guaranteed to be unbiased, but by cross-
referencing both, one can come to a relatively reliable catego-
rization on the political bias of the major news networks. These
sites covered the fifty largest mainstream channels, which
make up for almost 80 percent of all YouTube views.
Nevertheless, the majority of the political YouTube channels
were not included in sources categorizing mainstream outlets.
After reviewing the existing literature on political YouTube
and the categorization created by authors such as Ribero
et al. (2019) or Munger and Philips (2019), we decided to
create a new categorization. Our study strives for a granular
and precise classification to facilitate a deep dive into the
political subcultures of YouTube, and the extant categories
were too narrow in their scope. We decided to apply on both
a high-level left-center-right political classification for high-
level analysis and create a more granular distinction between
eighteen separate labels, described shortly in Table I or at
length in Appendix A-D).
In addition to these ’soft tags,’ we applied a set of so-called
’hard tags.’ These additional tags allowed us to differentiate
between YouTube channels that were part of mainstream
media outlets and independent YouTubers. The hard tags
TABLE I
CATEGORIZATION SOFT TAGS AND EXAMPLES
Tag Examples
Conspiracy A channel that regularly promotes a
variety of conspiracy theories.
X22Report, The
Next News Net-
work
Libertarian Political philosophy with liberty as the
main principle.
Reason, John
Stossel, The Cato
Institute
Anti-SJW Have a significant focus on criticizing
”Social Justice” (see next category) with a positive
view of the marketplace of ideas and discussing
controversial topics.
Sargon of Akkad,
Tim Pool
Social Justice Promotes identity Politics and inter-
sectionality
Peter Coffin,
hbomberguy
White Identitarian Identifies-with/is-proud-of the
superiority of ”whites” and western civilization.
NPIRADIX
(Richard
Spencer)
Educational Channel that mainly focuses on educa-
tion material.
TED,
SoulPancake
Late Night Talk shows Channel with content pre-
sented humorous monologues about the daily news.
Last Week
Tonight, Trevor
Noah
Partisan Left Focused on politics and exclusively
critical of Republicans.
The Young
Turks, CNN
Partisan Right Channel mainly focused on politics
and exclusively critical of Democrats, supporting
Trump.
Fox News, Can-
dace Owens
Anti-theist Self-identified atheist who are also ac-
tively critical of religion.
CosmicSkeptic,
Matt Dillahunty
Religious Conservative A channel with a focus on
promoting Christianity or Judaism in the context of
politics and culture.
Ben Shapiro,
PragerU
Socialist (Anti-Capitalist) Focus on the problems of
capitalism.
Richald Wolf,
NonCompete
Revolutionary Endorses the overthrow of the current
political system.
Libertarian
Socialist Rants,
Jason Unruhe
Provocateur Enjoys offending and receiving any
kind of attention.
StevenCrowder,
MILO
MRA (Mens Rights Activist) Focus on advocating
for rights for men.
Karen Straughan
Missing Link Media Channels not large enough to
be considered ”mainstream.”
Vox, NowThis
News
State Funded Channels funded by governments. PBS NewsHour,
Al Jazeera, RT
Anti-Whiteness A subset of Social Justice that in
addition to intersectional beliefs about race
African Diaspora
News Channel
are discussed in more detail in Appendix A. The difference
between ’soft’ and ’hard’ tags is that hard tags were based
on external sources, whereas the soft tags were based on the
content analysis of the labelers.
The tagging process allowed each channel to be character-
ized by a maximum of four different tags to create meaningful
and fair categories for the content. In addition to labeling
created by the two authors, we recruited an additional vol-
unteer labeler, who was well versed in the YouTube political
sphere, and whom we trusted to label channels by their existing
content accurately. When two or more labelers defined a
channel by the same label, that label was assigned to the
channel. When the labelers disagreed and ended in a draw
situation, the tag was not assigned. The majority was needed
for a tag to be applied.
The visual analysis in Figure 1 shows the intraclass corre-
lation coefficiency (ICC) between the three labelers. Based
on this analysis, we can determine that all three labelers
were in agreement when it comes to the high-level labels,
e.g., left-right-center. Besides, there is a high coefficiency in
the majority of the granular categories. On the left side of
the graph, we can see the intraclass correlation coefficiency
values, the estimates of the ”real” information captured by
our classification, which ranges from 0 to one. The larger the
number, the more similar the tags were. One the right side of
the Figure, we see the reviewer agreement in percentages.
The ICC values above 0.75 are considered excellent, be-
tween 0.75 and 0.59 are good and above 0.4 are consid-
ered as fair [48]. In our categorization, few classifications
measure under 0.4. However, we believe that the explanation
for this convergence is related to the nature of these cate-
gories. The low coefficiency scoring of groups,’Provocateur’,
’Anti-whiteness’ and ”Revolutionary,’ could be explained by
the labeler’s hesitation to apply these rather extreme labels
where consistent evidence was lacking. Besides, since each
channel was allowed four different ’soft tags’ defining these
subcategories, the channels were likely tagged by the other,
milder tags. The rationale behind the lack of agreement on
the ’Educational’ label is best explained by the fact that
this category classification might be somewhat superfluous.
Political content, even educational one, often has a clear bias,
and the content already belongs to one or more stronger
categories, such as Partisan Left or to channels that are non-
political.
Fig. 1. The intraclass correlation coefficiency between the three labelers
However, if one looks at the percentages of the agreement,
the agreement if very high in most cases. The only category
where disagreement seems to be significant is the left-right-
center categorization. However, this disagreement can be ex-
plained by the weighing applied when calculating the ICC
factor.
To assign a label, we investigated which topics the channels
discussed and from which perspective. Some channels are
overtly partisan or declare their political stances and support
for political parties in their introductions or have posted
several videos where such topics are discussed. For example,
libertarian channels support Ron and Rand Paul (Libertarian
politicians affiliated with the Republican party) or discuss
Austrian economics with references to economists such as
Frederick von Hayek or Ludwig von Mises or the fictional
works of the author Ayn Rand. Comparably, many channels
dedicated to various social justice issues title their videos to
reflect the content and the political slant, e.g., ”Can Our Planet
Survive Capitalism” or ”The Poor Go To Jail And The Rich
Make Bail In America” from AJ+.
Nevertheless, other channels are more subtle and required
more effort to tease out their affiliation. In these cases, we
analyzed the perspective that these channels took on political
events that have elicited polarized opinions (for example, the
nomination of Brett Kavanaugh in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Migrant Caravan, Russiagate). Similarly, we also analyzed the
reactions that the channels had for polarizing cultural events
or topics (e.g., protests at university campuses, trans activism,
free speech). If the majority of these considerations aligned in
the same direction, then the channel was designated as left-
leaning or right-leaning. If there was a mix, then the channels
were likely assigned to the centrist category.
The only way to conduct this labeling was to watch the
content on the channels until the labelers found enough
evidence for assigning specific labels. For some channels, this
was relatively straightforward: the channels had introductory
videos that stated their political perspectives. Some of the
intros are very clearly indicating the political viewers of the
content creator; some are more subtle. For example, a polit-
ical commentator Kyle Kulinski explicitly states his political
leanings (libertarian-left) in channel SecularTalk description.
In contrast, a self-described Classical Liberal discussion host
Dave Rubin has a short introduction of various guests, pro-
viding examples of the political discussions that take place
on his channel The Rubin Report. In other cases, the labelers
could not assign a label based on introduction or description
but had to watch several videos on the channel to determine
the political leanings. On average, every labeler watched over
60 hours of YouTube videos to define the political leanings
without miscategorizing the channel and thus misrepresenting
the views of the content creators.
Based on the eighteen classification categories, we created
thirteen aggregate groups that broadly represent the political
views of the YouTube channels. The eighteen ’soft tags’ were
aggregated from ideological groups and better differentiated
between the channels. For more details on tagging aggregation,
please see the Appendix A-B. These groupings were applied in
the data visualization rather than the more granular eighteen
categories for clarity and differentiation purposes. The next
section will discuss the data in more detail.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The data on YouTube channels a viewership each channel
garners provides us with insights as to how the recommenda-
tion algorithm operates.
Per the data collected for 2019, YouTube hosted more
channels with content that could be considered right-wing
than before. In defining right-wing, we considered categories
such as proactive ”Anti-SJW” (for anti-Social Just Warrior, a
term describing feminist/intersectionality advocates), Partisan-
Right, Religious Conservative, and to some extent Conspiracy
Channels (for brief explanations, see Table I). For longer
descriptions on the labels, see Appendix A). However, these
more numerous channels gained only a fraction of the views
of mainstream media and centrist channels. Categories such as
the Center/Left MSM category, Unclassified category (consist-
ing mainly of centrist, non-political and educational channels),
and Partisan Left, capture the majority of viewership. The
difference here is considerable: where Center/left MSM has
22 million daily views, the largest non-mainstream category,
Anti-SJW, has 5.6 million daily views. Figure 2 illustrates the
number of views for each category compared to the number
of channels.
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Fig. 2. Daily Views and Number of Channels
Figure 3 presents a chart of channel relations illustrating
relations between channels and channel clusters based on the
concept of a force-directed graph [49]. The area of each
bubble, but not the radius, corresponds to the number of
views a channel has. The force/size of the line links between
channels corresponds to the portion of recommendations be-
tween these channels. From this chart, we can see left-wing
and centrist mainstream media channels are clustered tightly
together. The Partisan Right cluster is also closer to the large
mainstream media cluster than it is to any other category. Anti-
SJW and Provocative Anti-SJW are clustered tightly together
2The Figure 2 and all the following Figures are applying the aggregated
categories rather than the granular labels show in Figure 1 and discussed in
Appendix A-B.
with libertarian channels, while smaller categories such as
Anti-theists and socialists are very loosely linked to a limited
number of other categories. White Identitarian channels are
small and dispersed across the graph.
Fig. 3. Channel Clusters
When analyzing the recommendation algorithm, we are
looking at the impressions the recommendation algorithm
provides viewers of each channel.
By impressions, we are referring to an estimate for the
number of times a viewer was presented with a specific recom-
mendation. This number is an estimate because only YouTube
is privy to the data reflecting granulated impressions. However,
public-facing data obtained from channels themselves provide
us with information on at least the top ten recommendations. A
simplified formula for calculating the number of impressions
from Channel A to Channel B is calculated by dividing the
number of recommendations from A to B by the number
of total recommendations channel A receives summed with
channel views and recommendations per video, multiplied
by ten (for further information, see Appendix A-A). Such
a calculation of impressions allows us to aggregate the data
between channels and categories.
Figure 4 presents the recommendation algorithm in a flow
diagram format. The diagram shows the seed channel cat-
egories on the left side and the recommendation channel
categories on the left side. The sizes of channel categories
are based on overall channel view counts. The fourth cate-
gory from the top is the most viewed channel category, the
Center/Left Mainstream media category (MSM). This group is
composed of late-night talk shows, mainstream media shows,
including the New York Times’ YouTube channel. The Partisan
Left category closely follows the Center/Left MSM category,
with the primary differentiating factor being that the Partisan
Left category includes the content of independent YouTube
creators. Together, these two most viewed categories garner
close to forty million daily views.
Several smaller categories follow the top two-categories.
Notably, the two-second largest categories are also centrist
or left-leaning in their political outlook. For example, the
two largest channels in the Anti-SJW category (JRE Clips
and PowerfulJRE)) both belong to an American podcast host,
Joe Rogan, who hosts guests from a wide range of political
beliefs. The Unclassified groups consist of centrist, mostly
apolitical, educational channels such as TED or government-
owned mainstream media channels such as Russia Today.
Based on our flow diagram, we can see that the recommen-
dation algorithm directs traffics from all channel groups into
the two largest ones, away from more niche categories.
Fig. 4. Flow diagram presenting the flow or recommendations between
different groups
Based on these data, we can now evaluate the claims
that the YouTube recommendation algorithm will recommend
content that contributes to the radicalization of YouTube’s user
base. By analyzing each radicalization claim and whether the
data support these claims, we can also conclude whether the
YouTube algorithm has a role in political radicalization.
The first claim tested is that YouTube creates C1 - Radical
Bubbles., i.e., recommendations influence viewers of radi-
cal content to watch more similar content than they would
otherwise, making it less likely that alternative views are
presented. Based on our data analysis, this claim is partially
supported. The flow diagram presented in Figure 4 shows a
high-level view of the intra-category recommendations. The
recommendations provided by the algorithm remain within
the same category or categories that bear similarity to the
original content viewed by the audience. However, from the
flow diagram, one can observe that many channels receive
fewer impressions than what their views are i.e., the rec-
ommendation algorithm directs traffic towards other channel
categories. A detailed breakdown of intra-category and cross-
category recommendations is presented by recommendations
percentages in Figure 12 and by a number of impressions in
Figure 13 in Appendix B show the strength of intra-category
recommendations by channel.
We can see that the recommendation algorithm does have
an intra-category preference, but this preference is dependent
on the channel category. For example, 51 percent of traffic
from Center Left/MSM channels is directed to other chan-
nels belonging to the same category (see Figure 12). Also,
the remaining recommendations are directed mainly to two
categories: Partisan Left (18.2 percent) and Partisan Right
(11 percent), both primarily consisting of mainstream media
channels.
Figure 5 presents a simplified version of the recommen-
dation flows, highlighting the channel categories that benefit
from the recommendations traffic. From this figure, we can
observe that there is a significant net flow of recommendations
towards channels that belong to the category Partisan Left.
For example, the Social Justice category suffers from cross-
category recommendations. For viewers of channels that are
categorized as Social Justice, the algorithm presents 5.9 more
recommendations towards the Partisan Left channels than
vice versa and another 5.2 million views per day towards
Center/Left MSM channels. Figure 5 also shows a ”pipeline”
that directs traffic towards the Partisan Left category from
other groups via the intermediary Center/Left MSM category.
This is true even for the other beneficiary category, the Partisan
Right, which loses 2.9 million recommendations to Partisan
Left but benefits with a net flow of recommendations from
different right-leaning categories (16.9M).
However, when it comes to categories that could be poten-
tially radicalizing, this statement is only partially supported.
Channels that we grouped into Conspiracy Theory or White
Identitarian have very low percentages of recommendations
within the group itself (as shown in 12). In contrast, channels
that we categorized into Center/Left MSM or Partisan Left or
Right have higher numbers for recommendations that remain
within the group. These data show that a dramatic shift to
more extreme content, as suggested by media [15] [30], is
untenable.
Second, we posited that there is a C2 - Right-Wing Advan-
tage, i.e., YouTube’s recommendation algorithm prefers right-
wing content over other perspectives. This claim is also not
supported by the data. On the contrary, the recommendation
algorithm favors content that falls within mainstream media
groupings. YouTube has stated that its recommendations are
Fig. 5. The Direction of Algorithmic Recommendations
based on content that individual users watch and engage in
and that peoples’ watching habits influence 70 percent of
recommendations.
Figure 6 shows the algorithmic advantage based on daily
views. From this Figure, we can observe that the two out of the
top three categories (Partisan Left, and Partisan Right) receive
more recommendations than other categories irregardless of
what category the seed channels belong to. Conversely, any
other category does not get their channels suggested by the
algorithm. In other words, the recommendation algorithm
influences the traffic from all channels towards Partisan Left
and Partisan Right channels, regardless of what category the
channel that the users viewed belonged to.
We can also observe this trend from a higher-level aggregate
categorization, as is presented in Figure 7. The Figure affirms
that channels that present left or centrist political content are
advantaged by the recommendation algorithm, while channels
that present content on the right are at a disadvantage.
The recommendations algorithm advantages several groups
to a significant extent. For example, we can see that when one
watches a video that belongs to the Partisan Left category,
the algorithm will present an estimated 3.4M impressions to
the Center/Left MSM category more than it does the other
way. On the contrary, we can see that the channels that suffer
the most substantial disadvantages are again channels that
fall outside mainstream media. Both right-wing and left-wing
YouTuber channels are disadvantaged, with White Identitarian
and Conspiracy channels being the least advantaged by the
algorithm. For viewers of conspiracy channel videos, there are
5.5 million more recommendations to Partisan Right videos
than vice versa.
We should also note that right-wing videos are not the
only disadvantaged groups. Channels discussing topics such
as social justice or socialist view are disadvantaged by the
recommendations algorithm as well. The common feature of
Fig. 6. Algorithmic Advantage by Groups
Fig. 7. High-level view of Algorithmic Advantages/Disadvantages in Rec-
ommendation Impressions
disadvantages channels is that their content creators are seldom
broadcasting networks or mainstream journals. These channels
are independent content creators.
When it comes to the third claim regarding YouTube’s
potential C3 - Radicalization Influence, i.e., YouTube’s al-
gorithm influences users by exposing them to more extreme
content than they would otherwise; this claim is also not
supported by our data. On the contrary, the recommendation
algorithm appears to restrict traffic towards extreme right-
wing categories actively. The two most drastic examples are
channels we have grouped under the categories of White
Identitarian and Conspiracy theory channels. These two groups
receive almost no traffic based on the recommendation algo-
rithm, as presented in Figures 12 and 6.
Fig. 8. Traffic from White Identitarian Channels
Another way to visualize the lack of traffic from recom-
mendations is to view the recommendations’ flow. Figures 8
and 9 show that the majority of the recommendations flow to
either towards Partisan Right, Center/Left MSM, and Partisan
Left content. The White Identitarian channel traffic is also
directed towards Libertarian and, to a small extent, even
towards centrist Anti-SJW content.
Besides, the Figure 2 showed that the daily views for White
Identitarian channels are marginal. Even if we would compare
the views of White Identitarian channels with the Conspiracy
channels, we could see that Conspiracy channels are twice as
viewed than content created by the White Identitarians. This
discrepancy is notable since Conspiracy channels seem to gain
zero traffic from recommendations (as shown in Figure 12)
and are the least advantaged group of all categories. While
MRA (Men’s Rights Activists) channels form the smallest
category in our study, the White Identitarian category is in the
bottom five of all groups. Another comparison that illustrates
the marginality of White Identitarian channels is the fact that
this group consists of thirty-seven channels with enough views
Fig. 9. Traffic from Conspiracy Channels
to fit within the scope of the study. The White Identitarian
category includes almost the same number of channels as
Libertarian channels but receives only a third as many views.
Our fourth claim stated that there exists C4 - Right-Wing
Radicalization Pathway i.e., YouTube algorithm influences
viewers of mainstream and center-left channels via increas-
ingly left-wing critical content to the extreme right.” Again,
these data suggest the opposite. The right-wing channel that
benefits the most from the recommendation algorithm is Fox
News, a mainstream right-wing media outlet. Figure 10 shows
that Fox News receives over 50 percent of the recommen-
dations form other channels, which map to the category of
the Partisan Right. Fox News also receives large numbers
of recommendations from every other category that could
be considered right-wing. This observation is aligned with
the overall trend of the algorithm to benefiting mainstream
media outlets over independent YouTube channels. Fox News
is likely disproportionally favored on the right due to a lack
of other right-leaning mainstream outlets, while traffic in the
Center/Left MSM and Partisan Left is more evenly distributed
among their representative mainstream outlets.
We can also analyze the overall net benefits the mainstream
media channels are receiving from the algorithm by aggre-
gating the mainstream channels into one high-level group and
Fig. 10. Algorithmic advantage for Fox News
independent YouTubers into another group and comparing the
algorithmic advantages and disadvantages for each. The third
group we separated from mainstream media and YouTubers
is the group we called the ”Missing Link Media.” This group
encompasses media outlets that have financial backing with
the traditional mainstream outlets but are not considered part
of the conventional mainstream media. For example, left-wing
channels such as Vox or Vice belong to this category, while
BlazeTV is an equivalent for the right-leaning media. Figure
11 shows the clear advantage mainstream media channels
receive over both independent channels and Missing Link
Media channels.
Fig. 11. Algorithmic Advantage of Mainstream Media
Finally, based on the findings and analysis of our four
claims, we conclude that these data offer little support to the
claims that YouTube’s recommendation algorithm will recom-
mend content that might be contributing to the radicalization
of the user-base. Only the first claim is partially supported,
while the data refute all the other three claims. Rejection of
these claims seems to be in line with studies that critique the
claims of YouTube’s algorithm as a pathway to radicalization
[50].
TABLE II
CLAIMS AND DATA SUPPORT
Claim Data Support
C1 - Radical Bubbles. Recommendations influence
viewers of radical content to watch more similar
content than they would otherwise, making it less
likely that alternative views are presented.
Partially
supported
C2 - Right-Wing Advantage. YouTube’s recom-
mendation algorithm prefers right-wing content over
other perspectives.
Not supported
C3 - Radicalization Influence. YouTube’s algorithm
influences users by exposing them to more extreme
content than they would otherwise.
Not supported
C4 - Right-Wing Radicalization Pathway.
YouTube algorithm influences viewers of mainstream
and center-left channels by recommending extreme
right-wing content, content that aims to disparage
left-wing or centrist narratives.
Not supported
YouTube has stated that its algorithm will favor more
recent videos that are popular both in terms of views as
well as engagement [38]. The algorithm will recommend
more videos based on a user profile, or the most current,
popular videos for anonymous viewers. YouTube has stated
that they are attempting to maximize the likelihood that a
user will enjoy their recommended videos and will remain
on the platform for as long as possible. The viewing history
determines whether the algorithm will recommend the viewer
more extreme content. Antithetical to this claim is that our data
show that even if the user is watching very extreme content,
their recommendations will be populated with a mixture of
extreme and more mainstream content. YouTube is, therefore,
more likely to steer people away from extremist content rather
than vice versa.
V. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
There are several limitations to our study that must be
considered for the future. First, the main limitation is the
anonymity of the data set and the recommendations. The
recommendations the algorithm provided were not based on
videos watched over extensive periods. We expect and have
anecdotally observed that the recommendation algorithm gets
more fine-tuned and context-specific after each video that
is watched. However, we currently do not have a way of
collecting such information from individual user accounts,
but our study shows that the anonymous user is generally
directed towards more mainstream content than extreme. Sim-
ilarly, anecdotal evidence from a personal account shows
that YouTube suggests content that is very similar to previ-
ously watched videos while also directing traffic into more
mainstream channels. That is, contrary to prior claims; the
algorithm does not appear to stray into suggesting videos
several degrees away from a user’s normal viewing habits.
Second, the video categorization of our study is partially
subjective. Although we have taken several measures to bring
objectivity into the classification and analyzed similarities
between each labeler by calculating the intraclass correlation
coefficiencies, there is no way to eliminate bias. There is
always a possibility for disagreement and ambiguity for cate-
gorizations of political content. We, therefore, welcome future
suggestions to help us improve our classification.
In conclusion, our study shows that one cannot proclaim
that YouTube’s algorithm, at the current state, is leading
users towards more radical content. There is clearly plenty
of content on YouTube that one might view as radicalizing
or inflammatory. However, the responsibility of that content
is with the content creator and the consumers themselves.
Shifting the responsibility for radicalization from users and
content creators to YouTube is not supported by our data.
The data shows that YouTube does the exact opposite of
the radicalization claims. YouTube engineers have said that
70 percent of all views are based on the recommendations
[38]. When combined with this remark with the fact that
the algorithm clearly favors mainstream media channels, we
believe that it would be fair to state that the majority of the
views are directed towards left-leaning mainstream content.
We agree with the Munger and Phillips (2019), the scrutiny
for radicalization should be shined upon the content creators
and the demand and supply for radical content, not the
YouTube algorithm. On the contrary, the current iteration of
the recommendations algorithm is working against the extrem-
ists. Nevertheless, YouTube has conducted several deletion
sweeps targeting extremist content [29]. These actions might
be ill-advised. Deleting extremist channels from YouTube does
not reduce the supply for the content [50]. These banned con-
tent creators migrate to other video hosting more permissible
sites. For example, a few channels that were initially included
in the Alt-right category of the Ribero et al. (2019) paper,
are now gone from YouTube but still exist on alternative
platforms such as the BitChute. The danger we see here is
that there are no algorithms directing viewers from extremist
content towards more centrist materials on these alternative
platforms or the Dark Web, making deradicalization efforts
more difficult [51]. We believe that YouTube has the potential
to act as a deradicalization force. However, it seems that the
company will have to decide first if the platform is meant
for independent YouTubers or if it is just another outlet for
mainstream media.
A. The Visualization and Other Resources
Our data, channel categorization, and data analysis used
in this study are all available on GitHub for anyone to see.
Please visit the GitHub page for links to data or the Data
visualization. We welcome comments, feedback, and critique
on the channel categorization as well as other methods applied
in this study.
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This paper has been submitted for consideration at First
Monday.
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APPENDIX A
CHANNEL CATEGORIZATION
A. Channel Views and Formulas
We have used several formulas in order to capture the flow
of recommendations. The main concept in our study is the
impression. Impression is an estimate for the number of
times a viewer was presented with a recommendation. We
count each of the top 10 recommendations for a video as an
”impression”. Only YouTube knows true impressions, so we
use the following process create an estimate:
Tag Examples
Impressions An estimate for the number of times a viewer was
presented with a recommendation. I.e. we count each
of the top 10 recommendations for a video as an ”im-
pression”. Only YouTube knows true impressions,
so we use the following process create an estimate:
Consider each combination of videos (e.g. Video A
to Video B)
(A to B impressions) = (recommendations from A to
B) / (total recommendations from Video A) x (*A’s
views) x (recommendations per video = 10)
Relevant impres-
sions
(A channel’s relevance %) x impressions
Channel views The total number of video views since first of Jan-
uary 2018
Daily channel
views
(channel views) * (days in the period videos have
been recorded for the channel)
Relevant channel
views
(daily channel views) * (channel relevance %)
B. Tag Aggregation
In order to create meaningful ideological categories, we
have aggregated the tags assigned for each channel. In order
to calculate the majority view, each soft tag is assessed
independently. For each tag, the number of the reviewer with
that rag must tally to more than half. Eighteen categories of
soft tags, the soft tags defining left, center, and right, and
the hard tags defining the media type, were aggregated for
the visualization and data analysis. The following list informs
which tags or tag combinations were aggregated to represent
an ideology, rather than just a collection of tags.
• White Identitarian → White Identitarian
• MRA → MRA
• Conspiracy → Conspiracy
• Libertarian → Libertarian
• AntiSJW and either Provocateur or PartisanRight →
Provocative Anti-SJW
• AntiSJW → Anti-SJW3
• Socialist → Socialist
• ReligiousConservative → Religious Conservative
• Social Justice or Anti-Whiteness → Social Justice
• Left or Center ’hard’ tag and Mainstream News or
Missing Link Media ’hard’ tag → Center/Left MSM
• PartisanLeft → Partisan Left
• PartisanRight → Partisan Right
• AntiTheist → Anti-Theist
3This group has a significant overlap with the intellectual dark web-group
as described by Ribero et al. (2019), Munger and Phillips (2019)
• Everything else → Unclassified
C. Hard Tags
Hard tags are tags sources from external sources. Any
combination of the following tags can be applied to a channel.
Hard tags are for comparison between the categorization
presented in this paper and other work, academic or otherwise,
and also used to distinguish between YouTubers and TV or
other mainstream media content.
Tag Examples
Mainstream News Reporting on newly received or
noteworthy information. Widely accepted and self-
identified as news (even if mostly opinion). Ap-
pears in either https://www.adfontesmedia.com or
https://mediabiasfactcheck.com.
To tag they should have ¿ 30% focus on politics &
culture.
Fox News, Buz-
zfeed News
TV Content originally created for broadcast TV or
cable
CNN, Vice
Ribeiro et al.’s alt-lite, alt-right, IDW As listed
in Auditing
Radicalization
Pathways on
YouTube [32]
D. Soft Tags
Soft tags are a natural category for US YouTube content.
Many traditional ways of dividing politics are not natural cate-
gories that would accurately describe the politics of YouTube
channels. In general, YouTubers are providing reaction and
sensemaking on other channels or current events in the United
States. We have created a list of categories that attempt to align
the stands taken by the channels more naturally, expanding the
categorization beyond the left, center, and right categories.
The tag needs to be engaging in some way to the current
meta-discussion about YouTube’s influence on politics. Our
list of categories intends to cover major cultural topics and
label channels to the best of our abilities. We have tried to
find specific positions that could be mixed and aggregate in
order to create categories that would represent ideologies.
Our guiding principle is that, in order to apply one of these
tags, one should be able to judge the channel by the channel
content itself. It is important not to rely on an outside judgment
about the channel’s content. It is also important to interpret the
content with full context: there should be no mind-reading and
no relying on a judgment from other sources. There should
also be enough channels per each category. If the category is
too niche, it should be excluded, unless it is essential for the
radicalization pathway theory.
Tag Examples
Conspiracy A channel that regularly promotes a variety of conspiracy theories. A conspiracy theory explains an
event/circumstance as the result of a secret plot that is not widely accepted to be true (even though sometimes it
is).
Example conspiracy theories:
• Moon landings were faked
• QAnon & Pizzagate
• Trump colluding with Russia to win the election
X22Report, The Next News Network
Libertarian A political philosophy that has liberty as its main principle. Generally skeptical of authority and
state power (e.g., regulation, taxes, government programs). Favors free markets and private ownership.
Note: To tag someone, this should be the primary driver of their politics. Does not include libertarian socialists
who also are anti-state but are anti-capitalist and promote communal living.
Reason, John Stossel, The Cato Insti-
tute
Anti-SJW Channel has to have a significant focus on criticizing ”Social Justice” (see next category) with a
positive view of the marketplace of ideas and discussing controversial topics. To tag a channel, this should be a
common focus in their content.
Sargon of Akkad, Tim Pool
Social Justice The channel promotes
• Identity Politics & Intersectionality narratives of oppression though the combination of historically
oppressed identities: Women, Non-whites, Transgender
• Political Correctness the restriction of ideas and words you can say in polite society.
• Social Constructionism the idea that the differences between individuals and groups are explained entirely
by the environment. For example, sex differences are caused by culture, not by biological sex.
The channel content is often in reaction to Anti-SJW or conservative content rather than purely a promotion of
social justice ideas.
The supporters of the content creator are active on Reddit in subreddit called r/Breadtube, and the creators often
identify with this label. This tag only includes breadtuber’s if their content is criticizing anti-SJW’s (promoting
socialism is its own, separate tag).
Peter Coffin, hbomberguy
White Identitarian Identifies-with/is-proud-of the superiority of ”whites” and Western Civilization. An example
of identifying with ”western heritage” would be to refer to the Sistine chapel or Bach as ”our culture.”
Often will promote
• An ethnostate where residence or citizenship would be limited to ”whites” OR a type of nationalist that
seek to maintain a white national identity (white nationalism)
• A historical narrative focused on the ”white” lineage and its superiority
• Essentialist concepts of racial differences
The content creators are very concerned about whites becoming a minority population in the US/Europe (the
Great Replacement - theory)
NPIRADIX (Richard Spencer), Stefan
Molyneux
Educational Channel that mainly focuses on education material, of which over 30% is focused on making sense
of culture or politics.
TED, SoulPancake
Late Night Talk shows Channel with content presented humorous monologues about the day’s news, guest
interviews, and comedy sketches. To tag, they should have over 30% focus on politics & culture.
Last Week Tonight, Trevor Noah
Partisan Left Channel mainly focused on politics and exclusively critical of Republicans. Would agree with this
statement: ”GOP policies are a threat to the well-being of the country.”
The Young Turks, CNN
Partisan Right Channel mainly focused on politics and exclusively critical of Democrats. Must support Trump.
Would agree with this statement: ”Democratic policies threaten the nation.”
Fox News, Candace Owens
Anti-theist The self-identified atheist who is also actively critical of religion. Also called New Atheists or Street
Epistemologists. Usually combined with an interest in philosophy.
Sam Harris, CosmicSkeptic, Matt Dil-
lahunty
Religious Conservative A channel with a focus on promoting Christianity or Judaism in the context of politics
and culture.
Ben Shapiro, PragerU
Socialist (Anti-Capitalist) Focus on the problems of capitalism. Endorse the view that capitalism is the source
of most problems in society.
Critiques of aspects of capitalism that are more specific (i.e., promotion of fee healthcare or a large welfare system
or public housing) don’t qualify for this tag.
Promotes alternatives to capitalism. Usually, some form of either Social Anarchist (stateless egalitarian com-
munities) or Marxist (nationalized production and a way of viewing society through class relations and social
conflict).
BadMouseProductions, NonCompete
Revolutionary Endorses the overthrow of the current political system. For example, many Marxist and Ethno-
nationalists are revolutionaries because they want to overthrow the current system and accept the consequences.
Libertarian Socialist Rants, Jason Un-
ruhe
Provocateur Enjoys offending and receiving any kind of attention (positive or negative). Takes extreme positions,
or frequently breaks cultural taboos. Often it is unclear if they are joking or serious.
StevenCrowder, MILO
MRA (Mens Rights Activist) Focus on advocating for rights for men. See men as the oppressed sex and will
focus on examples where men are currently oppressed.
Incels, who identify as victims of sex inequality, would also be included in this category.
Karen Straughan
Missing Link Media Channels funded by companies or venture capital, but not large enough to be considered
”mainstream.”
They are generally accepted as more credible than independent YouTube content.
Vox, NowThis News
State Funded Channels that are funded by governments. PBS NewsHour, Al Jazeera, RT
Anti-Whiteness A subset of Social Justice that, in addition to intersectional beliefs about race, has a significant
portion of content that essentializes race and disparages ”whites” as a group. Channel should match most of the
following:
• Negative generalization about ”whites”. E.g. ”White folks are unemotional, they hardly even cry at funerals,”
e.g., How To Play The Game w/WS 5 Daily Routines
• Use of the word ”whiteness” as a slur, or an evil force. e.g., ”I try to be less white” (Robin DiAngelo)
• Simplistic narratives about American history, where the most important story is of slavery and racism.
• Dilute terms like racism or white supremacy so that they include most Americans while keeping the stigma
and power of the word.
• content exclusively framing current events into racial oppression. Usually in the form of police violence
against blacks, x-while-black (e.g., swimming while black, walking while black)...
African Diaspora News Channel
APPENDIX B
DETAILED ALGORITHMIC ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES
We discuss algorithmic advantages and disadvantages at
the higher level in Section IV. This appendix presents two
additional figures that shows a breakdown of recommendation
algorithm traffic channel by channel.
First, Figure 12 presents the relative portion of recommen-
dations between groups. The diagonal column cutting across
the chart shows the percentages of intra-category recommenda-
tions, i.e., the percentage of recommendations that are directed
to the same category. In contrast, lower percentages in this di-
agonal that the majority of the traffic is directed outwards from
the category. The other cells show the percentages each group
is recommended in relation to other categories. For example,
if one is to view a video that belongs to the Provocative Anti-
SJW category, the bulk of the recommendations will suggest
videos that belong to either Partisan Right or non-political
channels.
The non-political channels in this chart are channels that fall
outside our labeled data categories. The Figure 12 illustrates
that these channels are recommended in large numbers for
categories that fall on the fringes, such as the White Identi-
tarian and MRA channels, directing the traffic towards less
contentious material.
Fig. 12. Cross-category and Intra-category Recommendations
Figure 12 presents the different advantages and disadvan-
tages each group has due to the recommendation system
in more detail. The Figure compares the daily net flow of
recommendations for each group. The categories in the Figure
are organized based on their algorithmic advantage, the most
advantaged groups are at the top, and least advantaged groups
are at the bottom. Categories in darkest shades of blue are
most advantaged, whereas the categories on darker shades of
red are at least advantage.
Fig. 13. Algorithmic Advantages/Disadvantages in Recommendation Impres-
sions
Categories in grey are also at a disadvantage, but to a lesser
extent than the categories in red the small arrows in the
image point towards the category, which is benefiting from
the recommendations algorithm. Arrows are pointing towards
the group that receives more recommendations that it is given
by the algorithm, i.e., pointing towards the group, which is
advantaged.
...
